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Policy Forum
T
he Chilean health system has 
been studied extensively [1]. 
Its current form is the result 
of a major reform undertaken by 
the Pinochet government following 
the coup d’état in 1973. Pinochet’s 
reform established competition 
between public and private health 
insurers and promoted private 
health services, following neoliberal 
principles. Neoliberalism is an 
economic and political movement 
that gained consensus in the 1980s 
among international organisations 
like the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. This movement 
demands reforms such as free trade, 
privatisation of previously public-
owned enterprises, goods, and services, 
undistorted market prices, and limited 
government intervention. After the 
publication of the World Bank’s 1993 
report, “Investing in Health” [2], Chile 
became a model for neoliberal reforms 
to health services.
In this Policy Forum, we assess the 
effects of the Chilean reform from 
Pinochet until 2005, and including 
the transition to democracy in 1990. 
We suggest that the use of Chile as a 
model for other countries of the health 
beneﬁts of neoliberalism is seriously 
misguided. We stress the dominant role 
of the public health system in Chile, 
while most other studies have assessed 
the introduction of a private insurance 
sector as part of the neoliberal 
reform. Revisiting the Chilean health 
reform after 25 years, we come to new 
conclusions that could be important for 
countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia, 
which are preparing health reforms, 
and even for the United States, with 
its current debate on universal health 
insurance.
Pinochet’s Reform and Its Context
Chile has been a social laboratory, having 
experienced democratic liberalism 
(1958–1964), Christian Democratic 
reformism (1964–1970), democratic 
socialism (1970–1973), neoliberal 
authoritarianism (1973–1989), and three 
democratic coalition governments from 
1990 to the present (see Glossary for 
deﬁnitions) [3]. The neoliberal reforms 
were not limited to the health system, 
but were also made to the pension 
system, in education, and through the 
privatisation of state industries. Many of 
the changes in the health system were 
later conceptualised in World Bank–
supported documents [4].
In 1979, after having brutally 
repressed opposition to the 1973 
coup against socialist president 
Salvador Allende, the Pinochet regime 
embarked on a sweeping health sector 
reform, based on neoliberal doctrines 
[5–7]. A private health insurance 
system, ISAPRES, was developed 
alongside the state system and was 
intended to be the dominant one. 
The two systems followed completely 
different rationales: the public system, 
a traditional “Bismarckian” social 
security system (members contribute 
a proportion of their wages to receive 
health services according to their 
need), promoted solidarity via risk-
sharing and the internal redistribution 
of health care resources, while the 
private system offered health insurance 
policies corresponding to each 
individual’s contributions. 
A National Health Fund (FONASA) 
was created in 1979 as a public agency 
to collect and manage the ﬁnancial 
resources coming from the compulsory 
contributions of employees who chose 
to remain in the public system (or 
who could not afford an adequate 
plan with an ISAPRES company), and 
from the national government’s health 
budget. There are four categories of 
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Summary Points
•  The Chilean health system underwent 
a drastic neoliberal reform in the 
1980s, with the creation of a dual 
system: public and private health 
insurance and public and private 
provision of health services. 
•  This reform served as a model for 
later World Bank–inspired reforms in 
countries like Colombia.
•  The private part of the Chilean health 
system, including private insurers and 
private providers, is highly inefﬁcient 
and has decreased solidarity between 
rich and poor, sick and healthy, and 
young and old.
•  In spite of serious underﬁnancing 
during the Pinochet years, the 
public health component remains 
the backbone of the system and is 
responsible for the good health status 
of the Chilean population. 
•  The Chilean health reform has lessons 
for other countries in Latin America 
and elsewhere: privatisation of health 
insurance services may not have 
the expected results according to 
neoliberal doctrine. On the contrary, 
it may increase unfairness in ﬁnancing 
and inequitable access to quality care.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0543 April 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 4  |  e79
insured within FONASA; A, indigent; 
B, very low income; C, lower-middle 
income; and D, higher-middle income. 
Categories B, C, and D are entitled to 
choose health care outside the public 
provider system, with varying levels 
of co-payment. Category A members 
are limited to public services, both for 
primary care and hospital services.
The private system, ISAPRES, was 
created in 1981 to manage the payroll 
contributions allocated to health care 
for those opting out of the state system. 
The private companies purchased 
most care from the private sector [8], 
which received an intense boost. The 
ISAPRES market offered no fewer 
than 8,000 different individual plans, 
designed according to sex, age, health 
risk, supplementary premiums, and 
co-payments. The market concentrated 
on relatively afﬂuent clients with lower 
health risks: the mean income of 
ISAPRES members in 2003 was more 
than four times higher than FONASA 
members [9]. The proﬁt margins of 
ISAPRES exceeded 20% [10].
The National Health Service was 
decentralised into 26 autonomous 
territorial health authorities. These 
entities took over responsibility for 
hospital care, while primary health 
care facilities were transferred to 
municipalities. The funding of public 
health services was drastically reduced 
[11]. Consequently, the supply of health 
care in public facilities was restricted. 
In March 1990, a coalition of centre 
and left-wing parties came to power 
and has won all the elections ever 
since. Its social policy has been broadly 
“social democratic”, seeking to attach a 
Western-style welfare state to a dynamic 
emerging market economy [12]. In 
the same year (1990), a government 
regulatory agency, known as the 
ISAPRES Superintendency, was created 
to establish some sort of regulation 
of ISAPRES. As Figures 1 and 2 show, 
public expenditure on health increased 
dramatically from 1990 [13], to 
almost three times more in constant 
pesos. While the proportion of public 
expenditure on health remained fairly 
stable at around 3%, from a low of 2% 
in 1976, economic growth explains 
the increase in absolute numbers. 
Private expenditure remained stable 
as a proportion of gross domestic 
product, but increased sharply in 
absolute numbers. To ﬁnance this 
increased public expenditure, a tax 
reform was approved that reversed the 
tax reductions of the Pinochet years 
[5,14,15].
However, none of the main features 
of the Pinochet reforms described above 
were substantially modiﬁed [3]. More 
recently, President Lagos’ government 
(2000–2006) initiated a new health 
reform plan (called Plan AUGE), 
aiming at better quality and shorter 
waiting times in the public sector and 
a minimum coverage plan in ISAPRES, 
but again, this policy remained broadly 
compatible with neoliberal reform.
The Main Features of Chile’s 
Neoliberal Health Reform
The partial privatisation of social 
security. The compulsory contributions 
made by workers and employees go 
either to the public social insurer 
FONASA or to one of the private health 
insurers of ISAPRES. During Pinochet’s 
regime, employers were relieved of the 
requirement to contribute on behalf 
of their employees. Table 1 presents 
the sources of health expenditure 
ﬁnancing for the year 2003 [11].
Out of Chile’s population of some 16 
million, 2.5 million of its more afﬂuent 
citizens were members of private 
ISAPRES insurance companies in the 
year 1995 (this was the year in which 
membership in ISAPRES reached 
its peak, after which there was a 
decline). ISAPRES was legally entitled 
to set premiums based on individual 
risk factors. Although control over 
ISAPRES was strengthened by the 
creation of the Superintendency, 
problems remained with regard to 
catastrophic health expenditure 
for lower-income ISAPRES 
members. Under pressure from the 
Superintendency, ISAPRES decided 
in 2001 to cover some catastrophic 
conditions, but the level of the 
“deductible” (the amount to be paid by 
the patient) remained very high. 
ISAPRES membership reached 
26% of the population in 1995 and 
declined to only 16% in 2006—a small 
proportion of the population, and 
not the one most in need of health 
care. The decline was due to improved 
performance by the public sector, 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050079.g001 
Figure 1. Public Expenditure on Health in Chile, 1970–2000 (Pesos 2000) 
As the graph shows, there was a sharp increase in public health expenditure (in 2000 Chilean 
pesos) in Chile after 1990, with social democratic governments. A short spike can be observed 
during the socialist Allende government. The lower darker line represents public expenditure, the 
upper lighter one public expenditure per person. From [13].
Table 1. Sources of Health Expenditure in Chile, 2003 (Millions of Chilean Pesos)
Systems Payroll Contributions Tax-Based Out-of-Pocket
ISAPRES 737,160 Unknowna 515,129
FONASA 477,142 706,518 202,530
Total 1,214,302 706,518 717,659
From [13].
aSubsidy for maternity licence, amount unknown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050079.t001PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0544 April 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 4  |  e79
unemployment caused by the Asian 
crisis in the 1990s, the AUGE plan, and 
the rising cost of private health plans. 
Some experts estimate that by 2010, 
ISAPRES may cover only 10% of the 
population [16].
Segmentation and lack of solidarity 
between two parallel health insurance 
systems. The ISAPRES system attracts 
the afﬂuent, male, young, and 
urban. In the poorest quintile of the 
population only 1.6% are members 
of ISAPRES, compared with 50.5% 
in the richest [11]. Adult women pay 
up to four times more than men for 
their health plans, and the proportion 
of ISAPRES members over 60 drops 
dramatically since they face premiums 
of up to eight times as much as those of 
young adults. Adults over 60 are forced 
to enter FONASA. Some ISAPRES 
companies are in an oligopoly position: 
the main three ﬁrms share close to 80% 
of the market [6].
The state has subsidised ISAPRES 
in several ways. First, until recently it 
subsidised ISAPRES to the tune of 2% 
of the salary of those who switched 
from FONASA to ISAPRES. Second, it 
pays for maternity leave for ISAPRES 
members. Third, 25% of patients 
covered by ISAPRES receive services 
in public facilities because they cannot 
afford the co-payments [17,18]. Almost 
half of all catastrophic events among 
children of ISAPRES members are 
treated in public hospitals [19].
Moreover, FONASA ﬁnances the 
private health care sector (category 
B, C, and D patients can choose 
to be treated by private providers 
via a voucher system). The money 
transferred to the private sector in this 
way is substantial, greater than what is 
spent on municipal primary health care 
[20].
The return of democracy: restoring 
an underﬁnanced public sector. The 
transition government inherited a 
series of problems with public health 
services from the Pinochet regime, 
including a major deterioration in the 
public infrastructure and inefﬁcient 
management in the decentralised 
organisations [17]. Primary 
care services suffered from poor 
coordination between the regional 
health services and the municipal 
authorities. Working conditions and 
wages had deteriorated. Rural areas 
and poor urban districts were worst 
affected in the quantity and quality 
of the services provided, introducing 
regional differences unseen before.
From 1990 to 2002, however, tax 
revenues doubled and allowed for 
an increase in social expenditure of 
240% over the same period. In 2000, 
expenditure on health care accounted 
for 7.3% of gross domestic product, 
3.1% on publicly provided care and 
4.2% on private care. In 2004, out-of-
pocket expenditures amounted to 27% 
of total health expenditure. 
We turn now to an assessment of 
the impact of the reform, focusing on 
equity–in terms of ﬁnance, access, and 
health status—and efﬁciency.
The Impact of the Reform: Equity 
Financial equity. Chile shares with 
Brazil the dubious distinction of having 
one of the most regressive patterns of 
income distribution in Latin America, 
and the distribution of spending on 
health is no exception. The private 
sector accounts for a disproportionate 
share of total health expenditure (38% 
of the total health expenditure was 
spent on 21% of the population in 
2004) [9]. This is a basic unfairness, 
and represents a lack of solidarity, since 
FONASA and ISAPRES have separate 
ﬁnancing [15].
Within the FONASA system, there is 
some internal redistribution between 
categories A–B and C-D, the latter 
helping to ﬁnance the health care of 
the former [21]. Between FONASA 
and ISAPRES there is some limited 
and indirect redistribution: ISAPRES 
members contribute directly to their 
individual health plans, but indirectly 
they make some contribution to the 
health care of the poor through the 
tax money received by FONASA [22], 
which accounts for half of its income.
Other dimensions of equity are also 
problematic. The ISAPRES system 
discriminates against women, whose 
participation in 2001 was only 34.4%, 
with lower-quality health plans than 
those of men [6]. Access to ISAPRES 
health plans depends on income, and 
women generally have lower incomes or 
are outside the remunerated workforce. 
Insurance policies for women of 
childbearing age may cost four times 
more than men’s policies [23].
Equity of access to care. Considering 
the basic inequality of Chilean society 
and the unfairness of its health sector 
ﬁnancing, one would expect access to 
care by the poor to be unequal as well. 
In fact the evidence is mixed: access to 
care is somewhat equitable, but quality 
of care is not.
Some data suggest relatively 
equitable access. In 1999, the utilisation 
rate (consultations per person per 
year) for FONASA patients was 3.85% 
and for ISAPRES patients 4.12% [20]. 
A 2003 national health survey [24] 
showed that among those who reported 
having felt sick in the last month, 
73.9% from the poorest quintile 
consulted with medical staff, compared 
with 79.7% from the richest.
But inequity may arise in the 
quality of health services. Frequency 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050079.g002
Figure 2. Health Expenditure in Chile, 1970–2004, as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
As a percentage of gross domestic product, public health expenditure rose under the Allende 
government, then decreased sharply under the Pinochet neoliberal experiment, and is now stable 
at around 3%. From [13].PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0545 April 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 4  |  e79
of surgeries and laboratory tests was 
positively correlated with income; 
more importantly, consultations with 
specialists were almost three times 
more frequent for patients in decile 
10 than those in decile 1 [24]. Access 
to specialists appeared deﬁcient in the 
public service: there were waiting lists 
of up to four years in some specialties, 
such as ophthalmology. Conversely, 
emergency visits were twice as frequent 
in the lowest income group. 
There are other reasons to believe 
that access is inequitable. Utilisation 
rates differ greatly between poor and 
rich municipalities: for primary care, 
by a factor of 2.8, for emergencies by 
a factor of 3.9, and for inpatients, by a 
factor of 2.0 [25]. 
The 2003 CASEN survey mentioned 
earlier [24] indicated that only 57.5% 
of FONASA members described their 
health as good or very good, compared 
with 80.6% of ISAPRES members. This 
should be reﬂected in higher utilisation 
rates for FONASA members, but as we 
have seen, the reverse is the case. 
Equity of health status. The Chilean 
model of development has been 
associated with rapid economic growth: 
gross national product increased 
7.9% per annum in the 1990s [17]. 
The country is ranked 22nd on the 
Global Competitiveness Index [26], 
far ahead of any other Latin American 
country, and 37th in the 2003 Human 
Development Report, although its 
development model has created high 
social inequality. In fact, inequality 
continued to increase even under 
the democratic post-Pinochet regime 
(Table 2).
Poverty (deﬁned as being below 
the poverty line, determined annually 
for individuals and families) was 
sharply reduced under the democratic 
governments, declining from 45% 
in 1985 to 21.7% in 1998 [27] and 
13.7 % in 2006 [28]. But income 
inequality rose, making Chile “the 
paladin [champion] of inequality” 
in the harsh words of Parada [29]. 
Before 1970, Chile’s GINI index (a 
measure of income inequality on a 
scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is complete 
income equality and 100 is complete 
inequality) was under 45; in the 1980s, 
it jumped to 65. In 2003 it was 57.5, 
a very unfavourable ﬁgure compared 
with, for instance, Costa Rica’s ﬁgure of 
45.9. The richest 20% received 17 times 
more income than the poorest 20% 
[27]; for comparison, in the US this 
group received 8.9 times more and in 
Peru 10.5 times more than the poorest 
20%.
In spite of this inequality, Chile’s 
average health indicators are good, 
with high life expectancy and low 
infant and maternal mortality, even 
with 27.3% of children under 10 living 
in poverty in 2003 [24]. The relatively 
equitable access to health care probably 
played a signiﬁcant role in this 
achievement, as did maternal and child 
protection programmes, carried out by 
the public sector. Still, the number of 
potential productive years of life lost 
is much higher in the poorest quintile 
of 20–79-year-olds in Santiago, 35% 
higher than in the richest quintile [30].
Another study suggests health 
inequities between municipalities: the 
tuberculosis incidence maximum/
minimum ratio between municipalities 
was 5.53, and for child malnutrition it 
was 5.00 [25]. The national department 
of epidemiology states that adjusted 
mortality for the poorest decile is 6.0 
out of 1,000, versus 4.8 for the richest 
[31]. 
The Impact of the Reform: 
Efﬁciency
Here the evidence is clearer. ISAPRES 
has hardly contained costs, and the 
ISAPRES companies never intended 
to do so: they have few incentives to 
be efﬁcient buyers of health services 
for their clients. Instead, they work 
hard to be efﬁcient in the selection 
of their clients (they are allowed to 
refuse clients). Their focus is on low-
risk, high-income patients, with the 
goal of making a proﬁt. They spend 
ten times as much on administration 
per member [9] and about two times 
as much on health care per member 
than FONASA (Figure 3), even though 
ISAPRES members are in better health 
and need less care [4]. To deliver 
care, ISAPRES companies rely on a 
burgeoning private sector, reimbursed 
on a fee-for-service basis, which induces 
an increased supply of unnecessary but 
proﬁtable services.
Discussion
Chile’s health indicators are good, 
compared with countries with a 
similar gross national product, such 
as Colombia and Argentina. These 
results are due in part to Chile’s high 
economic growth rate and a spectacular 
reduction in poverty [12,28,32]. 
Further signiﬁcant factors are the high 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050079.g003
Figure 3. Expenditure per Member, FONASA and ISAPRES, 1984–2002
The graph shows that per capita expenditure was always much higher in ISAPRES than in FONASA, 
and the difference has expanded in the past years. From [13].
Table 2. Percentage of Total Income per 
Decile, 1969–2000
Deciles 1969 1989 2000
Poorest decile 1.3 1.2 1.2
Richest decile 39 41.6 47
From [13].
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proportion of the population with 
access to drinking water and sanitation, 
and the high adult literacy rate and 
education level. But relatively equitable 
access to health care, mainly through 
public health insurance and public 
health services, which cover 80% of 
the population, played a major role in 
this achievement, as did maternity and 
child health protection programmes 
implemented through the public 
health network.
The democratic regime did not 
modify the essence of Pinochet’s 
health reform. Key features such as 
social security privatisation and the 
purchaser–provider split persisted. But 
public health expenditure was sharply 
increased to improve infrastructure, 
hire more personnel, and provide 
better equipment and salaries. The 
ISAPRES companies were placed under 
the control of a government regulatory 
agency to avoid commercial excesses.
As for the role that health care has 
played in achieving Chile’s favourable 
health indicators, a key conclusion 
from the foregoing analysis must be 
that results rested on the backbone of 
the public health system, which the 
neoliberal reforms were willing, but 
not able, to break. It is absolutely clear 
that the country’s health indicators are 
not due to the superior access to health 
care enjoyed by the better-off minority, 
who in any case continued to rely 
signiﬁcantly on the public system for 
many conditions and services. ISAPRES 
private health insurance never covered 
more than 25% of the population, 
and this proportion is now declining, 
thanks to a remarkable improvement 
in public health services. Even during 
the Pinochet regime the Chilean system 
was basically a public system, accessible 
to the 75% of Chileans who could not 
afford private insurance with ISAPRES. 
The effects of the neoliberal health 
reform in Chile remain marginal.
The neoliberal health reform in 
Chile has created an unfair dual health 
system: FONASA and public services 
for the poor, ISAPRES and private 
services for the more afﬂuent section of 
the population. ISAPRES now accounts 
for 40% of total health expenditure, 
on behalf of 16% of the population. 
The reform increased the incomes of 
private sector providers and decreased 
health system efﬁciency (through the 
incentive to over-treat inherent to fee-
for-service payment, through much 
higher administration and marketing 
costs, and through the fragmentation 
of service provision). 
To present the Chilean reform 
as a model to be followed by other 
countries, as has been done by the 
World Bank and other international 
bodies, is to disregard the evidence, 
which tends to show that Chile’s 
relatively successful health care 
provision has been achieved in spite of 
the reform, not because of it, or in fact 
because the intended neoliberal reform 
could not be implemented as foreseen. 
Another neoliberal reform, modiﬁed to 
avoid the segmentation that occurred 
in Chile, can be observed in Colombia, 
and the results are not encouraging 
[10,33].
A logical recommendation for 
a health system counter-reform in 
Chile would be to move from a multi-
insurer scheme to a single public 
insurer scheme, as in Costa Rica. This 
single payer (and its members) would 
then still be able to choose between 
public and private providers, but with 
strengthened bargaining power. This 
would put an end to the unfairness 
of ISAPRES spending twice as much 
on their members than FONASA, 
although FONASA’s members are a 
higher-risk population.  
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Christian Democratic reformism: 
political parties based on Christian 
principles in a democratic regime; 
reformist as opposed to revolutionary. 
In many European countries, Christian 
democrats have alternated in 
government with socialists. In Chile, the 
Frei administration, from 1964 till 1970. 
Democratic liberalism: in a democratic 
regime, a free or “liberal” market with 
little state intervention (in fact, orthodox 
conservative economics). Not to be 
confused with “liberal arts” or left-wing 
liberal democrats. In Chile, the Alessandri 
government from 1958 till 1964. 
Democratic socialism: regimes based 
on democracy and socialist principles 
like equity and solidarity; found in many 
European countries, such as Sweden. 
In Chile, the Allende Popular Unity 
government from 1970 till 1973
Neoliberal authoritarianism: 
orthodox neoliberalism combined with 
dictatorship. Neoliberalism demands 
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